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Abstract
This paper characterizes the class of strategy-proof and efficient rules in a labour 
production economy in which technology is linear and individuals may have une-
qual labour productivities. As each individual’s wage per hour is determined by his 
labour productivity under efficiency, an allocation rule reduces to a lump-sum trans-
fer rule. We characterize how strategy-proofness and other axioms put restrictions 
on the class of lump-sum transfer rules, and we show that what we can do using 
lump-sum transfers is quite limited.
Keywords Unequal skills · Strategy-proofness · Efficiency
1 Introduction
This paper characterizes the class of strategy-proof and efficient rules in a produc-
tion economy in which a consumption good is produced only from labour according 
to a linear technology and individuals may have unequal labour productivities.
As is shown by Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) that efficiency and fairness as 
absence of envy are incompatible when individuals have unequal skills, we have to 
make a choice between the two criteria. In this paper, we focus on efficiency. Under 
linear technology, efficiency alone implies that each individual’s wage per hour is 
completely determined by his labour productivity, and any distributive concerns 
must be taken care of by lump-sum transfers. This paper characterizes how strategy-
proofness and other axioms put restrictions on such lump-sum transfers.
In contrary to other environments such as abstract domain and exchange econ-
omy, there is a class of strategy-proof and efficient rules. This is with affinity to the 
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result by Maniquet and Sprumont (1999), which considers a production economy 
with linear technology.
We show that lump-sum transfer to an individual has to be independent of his 
preference when we impose the strategy-proofness condition that one can never gain 
by misreporting his preference. We also consider a stronger strategy-proofness con-
dition that one can never gain by misreporting his preference or hiding his skill. This 
implies that lump-sum transfer to an individual has to be non-decreasing in his skill 
level as well as independent of his preference.
The property that transfer to an individual has to be non-decreasing in his skill is 
already a stringent one, since it should be typically less skilled people who will need 
transfers if we insist on certain kind of fairness. This suggests that it is hard to save 
unskilled people even in the presence of skilled people. We show that under an addi-
tional axiom saying that having higher skill should not hurt anybody else the only 
possibility is a trivial case in which no redistribution is made.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the rest of this section, we illustrate how 
the current work is related to the existing literature. Section 2 presents the model 
and Sect.  3 presents the axioms. Section  4 presents the main results and Sect.  5 
concludes.
1.1  Related literature
The most closely related paper is Maniquet and Sprumont (1999), which character-
izes the class of strategy-proof and efficient allocation rules in a production economy 
with linear technology. Because of linear technology, price vector which supports 
efficient allocation is uniquely determined by technology alone, and the problem 
reduces to what lump-sum transfers should look like in order to be strategy-proof.
This paper is in the same sprit, as we assume linear technology and efficiency 
implies that an individual’s wage per hour is determined by his labour productivity, 
and any distributive concerns are taken care of by lump-sum transfers.
The results obtained in linear production economies contrast with the classic 
results in other environments. In the abstract social choice setting, Gibbard (1973) 
and Satterthwaite (1975) show that a strategy-proof and efficient rule must be dicta-
torial. In economic environments, Hurwicz (1972), and Zhou (1991) and Serizawa 
(2002) show that strategy-proofness and efficiency lead to impossibility or dictator-
ship in exchange economies.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) demonstrate that the requirement of absence of 
envy is incompatible with efficiency of allocation when nobody. On the other hand, 
Varian (1974) proposes a notion of envy-freeness in which we adjust labour hours 
by asking how many hours one needs to work to make the same production as what 
is made by another.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) characterize an efficient allocation rule which 
satisfies Maskin monotonicity, an implementability condition and also an infor-
mational efficiency condition, and a weaker version of envy-freeness stating that it 
holds only for some fixed reference preference. Despite taking the weaker version of 
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envy-freeness, they obtain that under additional axioms the set-valued solution must 
include the “trivial” solution which allows no redistribution.
We show, too, that it is hard to escape from the “trivial” solution under strategy-
proofness and efficiency. It is even more serious here, though, because we say we 
have to select the trivial solution, and any of the characterizing axioms says nothing 
explicitly about distributive concerns.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) propose an efficient resource allocation rule 
which satisfies skill monotonicity, an axiom stating that having higher skill hurts 
nobody. They provide a characterization of a rule satisfying the axiom, together with 
a distributional axiom stating that nobody should be made worse than the outcome 
of optimizing based on the lowest skill in the society and some other ones. Note 
that decentralizability conditions are not considered there, since as it is true in other 
environment as well decentralizability conditions and solidarity requirements are 
often in trade-offs, it is true in the current setting as well.
In the framework of fair social orderings, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) char-
acterize social orderings over allocations of labour and consumption based on the 
presumption that nobody is responsible for his skill level. In the framework of axi-
omatic bargaining, Yoshihara (2003) characterize a class of efficient allocation rules 
which allow people to be partially responsible for their skill levels.
Yamada and Yoshihara (2007); Yoshihara and Yamada (2010) provide condi-
tions for allocation rules in production economies with unequal skills which are 
implementable in Nash equilibria in a type of mechanism in which individuals may 
exaggerate or hide their skills, while the mechanism is designed so that it does not 
happen in equilibrium. In contrary, we assume that one cannot exaggerate his skill 
while he can hide it, because under linear technology the planner can always detect 
exaggeration ex-post and even partially ex-ante, and because hiding is the only type 
of information manipulation which can be handled in the framework of strategy-
proofness (see “Discussions” after the definition of strategy-proofness).
2  The model
Consider a production economy with n individuals, in which one consumption good 
is produced only from labour input. Assume that nobody holds any amount of con-
sumption good in the outset and everybody has 1 unit of time which can be used for 
labour or leisure. We normalize the minimal possible level of consumption equal to 
zero as it is taken to be an implicit fixed factor.
Let li denote individual i’s labour hour for each i = 1,… , n , then the total amount 
of consumption good produced is given by
where ai > 0 denotes i’s skill level. Let a = (a1,… , an) ∈ ℝn++ denote a profile of 
skill levels, which is taken to be variable.
n
∑
i=1
aili,
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Although one may think of a more general form of production function such as 
f
�
∑n
i=1
aili
�
 or more generally f (l1,… , ln) , we assume linear technology for two 
reasons. First, we view that most of ethical problems arising in the issue of unequal 
skills are already there in the simplest case of additive linear production, as far as 
the notion of individual skill remains clear and, thus, we restrict attention to it.1 Sec-
ond, we focus on the class of technology in which the planner can always calculate 
an individual’s observed productivity from his labour-output pair. This is critical for 
the planner to be able to detect exaggeration of reported skills. We will come to this 
point after the definition of strategy-proofness.
Each individual’s consumption space is [0, 1] ×ℝ+ . When (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ is 
given to individual i, it means he works for li units of time and consumes ci units of 
the consumption good, while he enjoys 1 − li units of time for leisure.
Thus, an allocation (l, c) = (l1,… , ln, c1,… , cn) ∈ [0, 1]n ×ℝn+ is said to be fea-
sible if
We also use the notation (l, c) = ((l1, c1),… , (ln, cn)) in an interchangeable manner. 
Given a = (a1,… , an) ∈ ℝn++ , let F(a) denote the set of feasible allocations under a.
Let R denote the set of preferences over [0, 1] ×ℝ+ , which are complete and 
transitive, continuous, strictly convex, and strongly decreasing in labour hours and 
strongly increasing in consumptions.
For each individual i, given his preference Ri ∈ R and a compact convex set 
B ⊂ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ , let m(Ri,B) denote the maximal element in B with respect to Ri , 
which is uniquely determined since Ri is strictly convex.
A social choice function is a mapping  ∶ ℝn
++
×Rn → [0, 1]n ×ℝn
+
 such that 
(a,R) ∈ F(a) for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn , where i(a,R) denotes the allocation for 
i = 1,… , n . Also, given (a,  R) and i, let li(a,R) denote the labour component of 
i(a,R) and ci(a,R) denote the consumption component of i(a,R).
It will be helpful to note here what we meant by “trivial” solution in the introduc-
tion. For each i, given wi > 0 and ti ≥ −wi , let B(wi, ti) denote i’s budget set with 
slope wi and intercept ti.
Definition 1  is said to be the trivial solution when it holds
for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n.
n
∑
i=1
ci ≤
n
∑
i=1
aili.
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, 0))
1 Further general form such as f (l1,… , ln) will allow complementarity between individuals’ labour 
inputs. Then, it becomes a non-obvious question what we mean by an individual’s own skill, even with-
out decentralizability arguments.
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3  Axioms
3.1  Strategy‑proofness
We present two versions of strategy-proofness. First one says that nobody can gain 
by misreporting his preference or hiding his skill. Note that one cannot exaggerate 
his own skill while he can hide his skill in a costless manner. For example, an indi-
vidual who can produce 10 units per hour can pretend to be able only to produce 5 
units per hour but cannot pretend to be able to produce 15 units per hour. 
Strategy-proofness (SP):  For all i, for all (a−i,R−i) ∈ ℝn−1++ ×R
n−1 and for all 
(ai,Ri), (a
�
i
,R�
i
) ∈ ℝ++ ×R with a′i ≤ ai , it holds 
 There are two reasons for assuming that an individual cannot exaggerate his skill. 
First is that because technology is additive and linear, and the planner can observe 
each individual’s labour input and own production, exaggeration is always detected 
ex-post and one can be severely punished after detection. For example, if an indi-
vidual reported that he can produce 15 units per hour but the planner observed that 
this individual produced 80 units in 8 h, instead of 120 units in 8 h, he concludes 
that the individual was able to produce only 10 units per hour and can detect the 
exaggeration.2 Again, this assumption requires that the planner can observe the truly 
spent labour hours as well as actual production, since otherwise one can for example 
pretend that a given production output can be achieved with shorter labour hours 
while the actual labour hours are longer, so as to disguise that his skill is higher. The 
second reason is a negative one: it is conceptually hard to allow actual possibility 
of exaggeration in the framework of strategy-proofness, and it requires a different 
framework. If an individual reports a fake information (a�
i
,R�
i
) where reported skill a′
i
 
is higher than true skill ai , then the prescribed allocation i((a�i , a−i), (R
�
i
,R−i)) itself 
may not be feasible.
When skill levels are known we face a weaker constraint that nobody can gain by 
misreporting his preference. In the standard literature, it is called “strategy-proof-
ness”, but in order to emphasize that informational incompleteness is limited to pref-
erences we call it preference strategy-proofness. 
Preference strategy-proofness (PSP):  For all a ∈ ℝn
++
 , for all i and R−i ∈ ×R
n−1 
and for all Ri,R�i ∈ R , it holds 
i((ai, a−i), (Ri,R−i))Rii((a
�
i
, a−i), (R
�
i
,R−i)).
i(a, (Ri,R−i))Rii(a, (R
�
i
,R−i)).
2 It is possible to consider that the individual was indeed able to produce 15 units per hour and he 
reported this truthfully but he did not use full force in actual production, but in that case he can be pun-
ished for another reason.
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3.2  Efficiency and envy‑freeness
Here, we state the axioms of allocative efficiency and equity. 
Pareto efficiency (PE):  For all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn , there is no (l�, c�) ∈ F(a) such 
that (l�
i
, c�
i
)Rii(a,R) for all i = 1,… , n and (l�i , c
�
i
)Pii(a,R) 
for at least one i.
Envy-freeness (EF):  For all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and for all i, j = 1,… , n , it holds 
i(a,R)Rij(a,R).
The following result is known due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1974).
Proposition 1 There is no SCF which satisfies PE and EF.3
Thus, we have to make a choice between efficiency and envy-freeness in the out-
set. In this paper, we focus on efficient rules, implying that an individual’s wage per 
hour must be completely determined by his labour productivity and any distribu-
tive concerns must be taken care of by lump-sum transfers. We study how strategy-
proofness and other axioms introduced below put restrictions on the class lump-sum 
transfer rules.
3.3  Welfare lower bounds
We introduce two axioms about welfare lower bounds. First one says that nobody 
should be made worse off than status quo, where the status quo is taken to be the 
point of no-work-no-pay. 
Individual rationality (IR):  For all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and for all i = 1,… , n , it 
holds i(a,R)Ri(0, 0).
Second one says that nobody should be made worse off than status quo, where the 
status quo point is such that everybody spends all his time on labour and gets paid 
according to the average skill. 
Average skill lower bound (ASLB):  For all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and for all 
i = 1,… , n , it holds 
 where a = 1
n
∑n
i=1
ai.
i(a,R)Ri(1, a),
3 Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) showed this using linear preferences, but their argument can be easily 
modified under strictly convex preferences.
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3.4  Axiom on comparative property
Finally, we introduce an axiom saying that when an individual’s skill is higher it 
should not hurt anybody else. 
Weak skill monotonicity (WSM):  For all i, for all ai, a�i ∈ ℝ++ with a
′
i
≤ ai , for all 
a−i ∈ ℝ
n−1
++
 , and for all R ∈ R , it holds 
for all j ≠ i.
By “weak”, we mean the axiom does not cover the condition that the individual 
himself should not get hurt when his skill is higher, since it is covered by SP.
4  Strategy‑proof and efficient rules
Here, we characterize the class of efficient allocation rules. Under efficiency, each 
individual’s wage per hour has to be equal to his labour productivity, and argument 
reduces to how lump-sum transfers should be.
The following result is helpful.
Lemma 1 Assume PE. Then,  satisfies PSP if and only if for all a ∈ ℝn
++
 , for all i 
and R−i ∈ R
n−1 and for all Ri,R�i ∈ R such that
for all (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ , it holds i(a, (R�i ,R−i)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)).
Proof “If” part: Suppose i(a, (R�i ,R−i))Pii(a, (Ri,R−i)) . Then, we can take R
��
i
∈ R 
such that
for all (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ and
for all (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ , and i(a, (R�i ,R−i))P
��
i
i(a, (Ri,R−i)) . Then, the condi-
tion implies i(a, (R��i ,R−i)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)) and i(a, (R
��
i
,R−i)) = i(a, (R
�
i
,R−i)) , 
which is a contradiction.
“Only if” part: Suppose it holds
for all (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ and i(a, (R�i ,R−i)) ≠ i(a, (Ri,R−i)) . By PE, 
i(a, (Ri,R−i)) is supported by a line with slope ai and intercept ti , and i(a, (R�i ,R−i)) 
j((ai, a−i),R)Rjj((a
�
i
, a−i),R)
(li, ci)P
�
i
𝜑i(a, (Ri,R−i)) ⟹ ci − aili > ci(a, (Ri,R−i)) − aili(a, (Ri,R−i))
(li, ci)P
��
i
𝜑i(a, (Ri,R−i)) ⟹ ci − aili > ci(a, (Ri,R−i)) − aili(a, (Ri,R−i))
(li, ci)P
��
i
𝜑i(a, (Ri,R−i)) ⟹ ci − aili > ci(a, (R
�
i
,R−i)) − aili(a, (R
�
i
,R−i))
(li, ci)P
�
i
𝜑i(a, (Ri,R−i)) ⟹ ci − aili > ci(a, (Ri,R−i)) − aili(a, (Ri,R−i))
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is supported by a line with slope ai and intercept t′i , where t
′
i
≠ ti , because if t�i = ti 
the above condition is met only when i(a, (R�i ,R−i)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)).
Without loss of generality, assume t′
i
> ti . Then, we can take R��i ∈ R such that its 
corresponding wealth-expansion path
exhibits that li(t) is non-increasing in t and ci(t) is increasing in t, and
and i(a, (R�i ,R−i))P
��
i
i(a, (Ri,R−i)).
Then, we have i(a, (R��i ,R−i)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)) because otherwise either of the 
two dominates the other, which leads to a violation of PSP.
Hence, we obtain i(a, (R�i ,R−i))P
��
i
i(a, (R
��
i
,R−i)) , which is a violation of PSP.  
 ◻
The result below states basically that under preference strategy-proofness any 
transfer to or from each individual has to be independent of his preference. Also, 
under strategy-proofness such transfer to each individual has to be non-decreas-
ing in his skill.
For each i, given wi > 0 and ti ≥ −wi , let B(wi, ti) denote i’s budget set with 
slope wi and intercept ti.
Theorem  1  satisfies PSP and PE if and only if there exists a list of functions 
t = (t1,… , tn) with ti ∶ ℝn++ ×R
n−1
→ ℝ and ti(a,R−i) + ai ≥ 0 for all i and 
∑n
i=1
ti(a,R−i) = 0 for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn++ ×R
n , such that
holds for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n.
Moreover, such  satisfies SP instead of PSP if and only if ti is non-decreasing in 
ai for each i = 1,… , n.
Proof It suffices to show the sufficiency of the axioms.
Pick any (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn , then by PE for each i the allocation i(a,R) is sup-
ported by the straight line with slope ai and intercept denoted by ti(a,R) . By con-
struction, it holds ti(a,R) + ai ≥ 0.
Since ci(a,R) = ti(a,R) + aili(a,R) for each i and from PE, we have
which implies
(li(t), ci(t)) = m(R
��
i
,B(ai, t)), t ≥ −ai
(li(ti), ci(ti)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)),
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, ti(a,R−i)))
n
∑
i=1
ti(a,R) +
n
∑
i=1
aili(a,R) =
n
∑
i=1
ci(a,R) =
n
∑
i=1
aili(a,R),
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To show that ti(a,R) is independent of Ri , suppose ti(a, (R�i ,R−i)) > ti(a, (Ri,R−i)) . 
Then, we can take R��
i
∈ R such that
for all (li, ci) ∈ [0, 1] ×ℝ+ , and i(a, (R�i ,R−i))P
��
i
i(a, (Ri,R−i)).
By Lemma 1, we have i(a, (R��i ,R−i)) = i(a, (Ri,R−i)).
Hence, we obtain i(a, (R�i ,R−i))P
��
i
i(a, (R
��
i
,R−i)) , which is a violation of PSP.
Now we show ti is non-decreasing in ai under SP. Suppose 
ti(a
�
i
, a−i,R−i) < ti(ai, a−i,R−i) for a′i > ai . Since ti is independent of i’s preference, 
we can take Ri such that
which is a violation of SP.   ◻
We consider further restrictions on the class of lump-sum transfer rules. Next 
result states that in the above class allocation rules adding the individual rationality 
axiom implies that the solution has to be trivial, in which there is no redistribution.
Theorem 2  satisfies PSP, PE and IR if and only if it holds
for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n.
Proof It suffices to show the sufficiency of the axioms. Note that IR implies NC.
Pick any i, pick any a ∈ ℝn
++
 , i and R−i ∈ R
n−1.
Suppose ti(a,R−i) < 0 . Since ti(a,R−i) is independent of Ri we can take Ri ∈ R 
such that (0, 0)Pii(a, (Ri,R−i)) , which is a violation of IR.
Thus, ti(a,R−i) ≥ 0 holds for all i. Since 
∑n
i=1
ti(a,R−i) = 0 , we have ti(a,R−i) = 0 
for all i.   ◻
Replacing IR by ASLB results in selecting a solution which equalizes poten-
tial incomes to be earned when they spend all their time on labour. This solution 
severely punishes the skilled people, though.
Theorem 3  satisfies PSP, PE and ASLB if and only if it holds
for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n , where a = 1
n
∑n
i=1
ai.
Proof It suffices to show the sufficiency of the axioms. Note that ASLB implies NC.
Pick any i, pick any a ∈ ℝn
++
 , i and R−i ∈ R
n−1.
n
∑
i=1
ti(a,R) = 0.
(li, ci)P
��
i
𝜑i(a, (Ri,R−i)) ⟹ ci − aili > ci(a, (Ri,R−i)) − aili(a, (Ri,R−i))
i(ai, a−i,Ri,R−i)Pii(a
�
i
, a−i,Ri,R−i),
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, 0))
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, a − ai))
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Suppose ti(a,R−i) < a − ai . Since ti(a,R−i) is independent of Ri we can take 
Ri ∈ R such that (1, a)Pii(a, (Ri,R−i)) , which is a violation of ASLD.
Hence, ti(a,R−i) ≥ a − ai holds for all i. Since 
∑n
i=1
ti(a,R−i) = 0 follows from 
feasibility, we have ti(a,R−i) = a − ai for all i.   ◻
Example 1 Here is a class of rules satisfying SP and PE and includes the above solu-
tion as the endpoint: given  ∈ [0, 1] , the allocation rule is defined by
for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n , where a = 1
n
∑n
i=1
ai . Notice that when 
 = 0 it reduces to the trivial solution and when  = 1 it reduces to the solution to 
equalize potential incomes.
Note, however, that it does not satisfy SP except when  = 0 , since it in general 
hurts an individual when he has higher skill.
Now let us not insist on either of IR or ASLB and return to the class of alloca-
tion rules as characterized in Theorem 1. It is already a stringent property, how-
ever, that transfer to an individual has to be non-decreasing in his skill under SP, 
because the purpose of transfer is typically to help less skilled people. This sug-
gests that it is hard to save unskilled people even in the presence of skilled peo-
ple. Weak Skill Monotonicity is an axiom stating that if one has more skill it 
should not hurt anybody else, while the requirement that it should not hurt him-
self is covered by SP. The result below states that when we strengthen PSP to 
SP and add WSM the lump-sum transfers must be zero, which is the case of the 
trivial solution.
Theorem 4  satisfies SP, PE and WSM if and only if it holds
for all (a,R) ∈ ℝn
++
×Rn and i = 1,… , n.
Proof It suffices to show the sufficiency of the axioms.
Pick any a, a� ∈ ℝn
++
 with a′ ≥ a and pick arbitrary R ∈ Rn.
Suppose ti(a�i , a−i,R−i) < ti(a,R−i) . Since R ∈ R
n was arbitrary and ti is independ-
ent of Ri , we can take it so that m(Ri,B(ai, ti(ai, a−i,R−i)))Pim(Ri,B(a�i , ti(a
�
i
, a−i,R−i))) , 
that is, i(ai, a−i,R)Pii(a�i , a−i,R) , which is a violation of SP. Hence 
ti(a
�
i
, a−i,R−i) ≥ ti(a,R−i).
Suppose tj(a�i , a−i,R−j) < tj(a,R−j) for some j ≠ i . Since R ∈ R
n was arbitrary 
and tj is independent of Rj , we can take it so that
that is, j(ai, a−i,R)Pjj(a�i , a−i,R) , which is a violation of WSM. Hence 
tj(a
�
i
, a−i,R−j) ≥ tj(a,R−j) for all j ≠ i.
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, (a − ai)))
i(a,R) = m(Ri,B(ai, 0)),
m(Rj,B(aj, tj(ai, a−i,R−j)))Pjm(Rj,B(a
�
i
, tj(a
�
i
, a−i,R−j))),
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Since 
∑n
j=1
tj(a
�
i
, a−i,R−j) =
∑n
j=1
tj(ai, a−i,R−j) = 0 , we obtain 
tj(a
�
i
, a−i,R−j) = tj(a,R−j) for all j = 1,… , n.
By repeating the above argument, we obtain tj(a�,R−j) = tj(a,R−j) for all 
j = 1,… , n.
Pick any a, a� ∈ ℝn
++
 , and let a ∧ a� be the vector defined by (a ∧ a�)i = min{ai, a�i}
for each i. Then, since tj(a,R−j) = tj(a ∧ a�,R−j) and tj(a�,R−j) = tj(a ∧ a�,R−j) we 
obtain tj(a�,R−j) = tj(a,R−j) for all j = 1,… , n . Hence, tj is independent of a for all 
j = 1,… , n , and we write it by tj(R−j).
Now we show tj(R−j) ≥ 0 . Suppose tj(R−j) < 0 for some j. Then, there exists 
a ∈ ℝn
++
 such that tj(R−j) + aj < 0 , which violates feasibility of allocation. Hence 
tj(R−j) ≥ 0 for all j.
Since 
∑n
j=1
tj(R−j) = 0 , we obtain tj(R−j) = 0 for all j.   ◻
None of the above axioms says anything explicit about distributive justice, but the 
conjunction of them allows only the trivial case in which no redistribution is allowed.
5  Concluding remarks
We have characterized the class of strategy-proof and efficient rules in a labour produc-
tion economy in which technology is linear and individuals may have unequal labour 
productivity. As each individual’s wage per hour is determined by his labour productiv-
ity under efficiency, an allocation rule reduces to a lump-sum transfer rule.
We have shown that lump-sum transfer to an individual has to be independent of his 
preference when we impose the strategy-proofness condition that one can never gain by 
misreporting his preference. We also consider a stronger strategy-proofness condition 
that one can never gain by misreporting his preference or hiding his skill. The latter 
implies that lump-sum transfer to an individual has to be non-decreasing in his skill 
level as well as independent of his preference.
We have shown that under an additional axiom saying that having higher skill should 
not hurt anybody else the only possibility is the trivial case in which no redistribution 
is made.
This suggests that what we can do using lump-sum transfers under the presump-
tion of efficiency is quite limited, and it may be worth thinking of using distortionary 
wages/taxes as well as lump-sum transfers to accommodate with distributive concerns.
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